

# **Progressive Surprise in the 1992 Davis City Council Election: New Trend or Old Story?**

by

**John Lofland**

The results of the June, 1992 Davis City Council election surprised liberals and conservatives alike. After several years of declining fortunes, progressive candidates made an unexpectedly strong showing. Some observers interpreted this as a resurgence of liberal or progressive sentiment in the Davis electorate. Others, though, argued that the election represented only some special circumstances of the field of candidates and the particular issues of that Spring, especially the spectre of a bulldozed Olive Drive that brought progressives to the polls in more than ordinary numbers.

I want here to examine the pattern of voting in the June, 1992 election and some other election statistics in an effort to determine which, if either, of these interpretations is accurate. More generally, I want to contemplate the “meaning” of the 1992 election in terms of its implications for the kinds of candidates who are elected.

## **1. The Progressive-Conservative Division: Little Change**

A first question we need to ask in order to understand the “surprise progressive” results of the 1992 election is: What is the division between the percentage of progressive and conservative voters in Davis and is it changing? I have tried to answer this question by adding up the votes for Skinner, Buckley, Forbes and Whitehead as, overall, “conservative,” and those for Rosenberg, Partansky and Watkins as, overall, “progressive.” (Milbrodt was unclear to me.) These sums are shown in Table 1 (appended), where a conservative-progressive division of 54 versus 44 percent is shown, with two percent unclear.<sup>1</sup>

As is evident, without comparison, 54 versus 44 percent has little meaning. To provide some perspective, I have done the same kind of calculation on the 1984 City Council election, an election that I, together with Lyn Lofland, have analyzed in previous work and that can serve as a point of reference.<sup>2</sup> The result is shown in the first column of Table 1. Classification of all candidates as one or the other is obviously a hazardous task, but if my categorization is valid, it would appear that the progressive-conservative division in voting did not change greatly between the two elections. If anything, the conservatives are slightly stronger in 1992. At least, a progressive surge is not in evidence.

## **2. Unusual Turnout: No**

Shortly before the 1992 election there was considerable discussion of the possibility of tearing down the Olive Drive section of Davis and turning most of it into an up-scale and freeway oriented shopping complex. As an historic enclave of progressive and neo-counterculture lifestyles, people on the left and others mobilized to prevent any such action. That mobilization, some pundits argued, carried over into the election and explains the surprise Partansky showing and the poorer than expected showing of Skinner, who was an early proponent of the shopping complex.

We can begin to test this theory by examining the city-wide turnout percentage for 1992 and, again, comparing that figure to the one for 1984. These figures are shown in Table 2 (appended), where we see that the 1992 turnout was actually three percent lower than in 1984 (a decline in line with the continuing decline of voting the United States).<sup>3</sup>

## **3. High Progressive Turnout: No**

However, the turnout rate does not directly test the theory of high progressive turn out. Even though we know (from Table 1), that the percentage of progressive votes did not increase (and perhaps declined), there could still have been a surge in progressive voting as a percentage of progressives.

One way to try to determine this is to make use of the ecological fact that progressive and conservative voters are not randomly distributed over the landscape of Davis. Instead, some precincts are enclaves of progressive sentiment and yet others are very densely conservative in voting pattern. Through comparing the turnout rates between such areas for the 1992 and 1984 elections, we can determine whether progressive (or conservative) voting rose, declined, or stayed the same.

In 1984 and as part of an effort to understand the Council election of that year, Lyn Lofland and I visited every precinct in the city in order to measure each one's manifest social class characteristics.

Especially important dimensions we chronicled were: (1) prevalence of apartment houses versus single-family homes; (2) lot and house size; (3) prevalence of custom versus tract housing; (4) lushness of landscaping; (5) level of maintenance of landscaping; and (6) degree of street and lawn clutter (e.g. disabled automobiles, recreational vehicles, litter, children's toys, other machinery).<sup>4</sup>

Using these dimensions, we classified precincts into five categories of class and lifestyle, which are, in ascending order:

1. Scruffy: ....small tract and/or old houses situated on small lots with modest and unkept landscaping. There is an abundance of street and yard litter. The houses are interspersed with occasional small-to-medium-sized apartment buildings that are rather poorly maintained.
2. Apartments. precincts...exclusively or almost exclusively composed of apartment houses or large apartment complexes. Inhabited mostly by UCD students, many of these houses and complexes are quite well maintained and their residents, apparently, from affluent families.
3. Working Class. ....homes are tract-built but somewhat larger than in the “scruffy” class-precincts. The streets are cluttered, although less so than the scruffy neighborhoods and the many recreational vehicles are better maintained.
4. Lower-middle Class. There is considerable range ....in the middle-class grouping, but we found it difficult to divide them any further than into a “lower” and an “upper” portion....Our lower-middle class category consists of areas dominated by smaller houses on smaller lots.
5. Upper-Middle Class. ...the upper range of the middle-class contain the largest and most expensive custom-built homes in Davis. Many of these have exotic architecture with professionally crafted and maintained landscapes.<sup>5</sup>

One complication is that some precincts are too diverse in class characteristics to fit reasonably into one of the above five categories. In 1984, there were 4 of these out of 51 consolidated precincts. In 1992, this rose to 12 out of the 38 precincts into which the election was consolidated.<sup>6</sup> (The number of these unclassifiable precincts is higher for 1992 because the greater degree of consolidation created a larger number of heterogeneous units.)

By classifying the precincts in the two elections in terms of this class-precinct scheme, we can compare the extent to which each class voted in greater or less percentage in 1992 than in 1984. The results are shown in Table 3 (appended). The scruffy class-precincts are the presumptive concentrations of Davis progressive votes. If there was a mobilization effect, it should show up there most of all. Fifty-two percent of scruffies voted in 1984 as compared to 50% in 1992, a seeming decline rather than increase. It is, however, a one percent smaller decline than the three percent decline seen in city-wide voting (60% declining to 57%). While the Olive Drive controversy may have slowed the decline, it is difficult to see a mobilization surge in these numbers.

Is there evidence, though, of greater mobilization in other classes? We do see the working class turning out in a somewhat larger percentage (61 rising to 64), but their absolute

numbers are so small that they could have had little impact on the election. In the other classes we see the same rates of turnout, or even declines, some of considerable magnitude, especially among the apartment dwellers and the lower middle class (50 down to 44 percent and 64 down to 59 percent, respectively).

Therefore, these data do not easily support a theory of special mobilization in response to the threat to Olive Drive. I want nonetheless to be cautious about this conclusion. These data are “ecological correlations” rather than direct, individual voting correlations. The social class classification scheme is itself crude. As a consequence, different and better data might not show the same pattern.

#### **4. Social Class/Lifestyle Effects: Exploration Part A.**

Assuming, though, that the above results are accurate, how are we to understand the surprise voting of the June election? What other account might we develop to explain Rosenberg’s strong first, Partanky’s surprise second, Skinner’s unexpected third, and the near-but-so-far fourth and fifth place finishes of the champions of the “School Board Crowd?”

My general disposition in understanding social matters is to be alert to the operation of social class inequalities and lifestyle conflicts. Applied here, I think it is helpful to ask what role, if any, social class and lifestyle divisions played in who ran how strong in the election. Looking back at the five categories of class explained above, if class and lifestyle were irrelevant, we would expect each of the eight candidates to receive votes in each social class in proportion to the percent they received in the city overall. Such an evenness of support, at whatever level, would imply that class perceptions, feelings, and advocacy — if they exist — did not affect how people voted on given candidates. (It would not, though, firmly establish this irrelevance, for, the percentages could be the same for different reasons in each class, some of which might involve social class matters.)

Conversely, if people in different social classes vote differently for different candidates, this implies that candidates are perceived as either supporting or opposing what voters perceive as their class or lifestyle interests. This implication is strengthened to the degree that we see a systematic pattern of variation across classes and not simply irregular fluctuations.

Pursuing this idea, the 1992 voting data were grouped into class levels and the proportion of people in each class who voted for each of the eight candidates was calculated. The results are shown in Table 4 (appended). The bottom row of the table shows the percentage of voters who voted for each candidate citywide. Above that citywide percentage in each column, the percentage of voters in each social class who voted for each candidate is shown.

Inspected overall, there are pronounced class effects with respect to almost all the candidates, but effects that also differ dramatically from candidate to candidate. Looking first at the progressive candidates, we see that Rosenberg ran 43% citywide but stronger than this among the scruffies and apartments, in the latter of which he ran exceptionally strong. He was somewhat weaker than his citywide average in the working and lower middle classes. But, compared to all the other candidates save Milbrodt, I think we have to say the class effects are less in his case than with other candidates. His strength has the unusual feature of class-breadth rather than a pronounced class skewing. Stated in terms of the number of percentage points he ran above and below his citywide percentage, Rosenberg shows this profile of ascending class response.

+4    +7    -3    -3    -1

The second progressive, Partansky, is quite different. For her, there is a very pronounced class effect. Running 40% citywide, she received far and away the highest class-precinct percentage of everyone in garnering 54% of the scruffy vote. At 14 percentage points above her citywide percentage, this is the single largest positive class effect. Looking at all five of her class percentages, we see that as social class increases, her percentage of the vote decreases in wonderfully consistent progression: 54, 44, 40, 36, 34. Her profile of percentage points above and below her citywide average is:

+14    +4    0    -4    -6

Notice that these “above and below” variations oscillate more widely than those of Rosenberg, just above.

Voting for the third progressive, Watkins, also shows a class effect, but it is somewhat weaker than for Partansky. He gets a strong boost among the scruffies (10 points above his citywide average), but other class levels do not respond to him consistently and in a strongly differential fashion. His percentages up and down from his citywide average are:

+10    -2    +2    -3    -1

Turning now to the three leading conservatives, taken as a group Skinner, Buckley and Forbes show class effects that are even stronger than among the three progressives considered as a set. Skinner, though, is the least strongly polarized on class and he is responded to in an inconsistent fashion:

-8    +7    -3    +1    +3

The strongest class responses are seen in the cases of Buckley and Forbes. Buckley's differential draw is opposite that of Partansky: 25, 28, 38, 39, 43. Stated as a points above and below his citywide percentage, his profile is:

-12    -9    +1    +2    +6

Forbes presents a similar class-polarized profile:

-12   -7   -2   +4   +5

Running in a tier below the others, Whitehead displays a clear but inconsistent class effect profile:

-1   -9   +6   +3   -1

At five percent of the citywide vote, Milbrodt's base is not large enough to allow for much variation and, indeed, it does not show much:

0   -2   0   0   0

If we take the sum of the percentage points above and below each candidate's citywide percentage (and ignore the minus signs) we have a rough index of the strength of differential class response. In such terms, Milbrodt, with a 2, was far and away the most class-consensual of candidates! Applying that logic to the other candidates, they rank in this fashion on the strength of the differences with which classes responded to them:

Buckley	30
Forbes	30
Partansky	29
Skinner	22
Whitehead	20
Rosenberg	18
Watkins	18

Of course, in a more refined analysis one would need to correct for varying sizes of the base percentage from which there is variation. Such a correction would make this order even stronger, however, since the first and second ranked candidates had lower base percentages and the candidate with the highest base (Rosenberg) already ranks low.

Before discussing how all this might help us to understand the 1992 City Council results, let me look at class effects in another way that can serve to sharpen our perception of what was happening in the election, at least with respect to class.

**5. Social Class/Lifestyle Effects: Exploration, Part B.**

In one sense, there were thirty-eight elections rather than simply one in the City Council election. That is, citizens voted by precinct — thirty-eight of them in this election — and the votes of each precinct are reported separately. It thus becomes possible to treat each of these thirty-eight as a separate election and to ask how many of the elections each candidate won (i. e. was in the top three)? Most pertinent here, if we divide the precincts by social class levels, what percentage of precincts did each candidate carry at each class level? Like the analysis of raw votes just discussed, this reveals class effects. But, it is different in now more sharply revealing

the relative standing of each candidate when pitted against each of the others for one of the top three places in the field of eight.

The results are presented in Table 5. The number and percentage of precincts that each candidate carried (was one of the top three finishers), are shown in the bottom row. Most notable, Rosenberg and Skinner carried significantly more precincts (27 and 25, respectively) than did Partansky, Buckley and Forbes (18, 17, and 18, respectively). The relatively weaker class polarization we see in the raw voting (Table 4) is also revealed here in Rosenberg and Skinner also carrying more precincts than did the other three strong finishers. It is notable, also, that while Partansky finished second, she did not carry an importantly different number of precincts than the two candidates who finished fourth and fifth. In the sense of breadth of support, we might say that Skinner ran stronger than Partansky even though he finished third and she finished second. That is, he carried 66% percent of precincts while she carried 47%, the same percentage as Forbes and virtually the same as Buckley. Indeed, Skinner and Partansky's raw votes are quite close, she exceeding him by 76 in the more than 12,000 they garnered together (Table 4).

Considering the three progressives, we see Rosenberg's breadth of strength even more sharply, along with an also sharpened picture of the narrowness of Partansky's class/lifestyle base. She did, though, carry one upper middle class precinct to which I should call attention because it is also a wild card for two of the other candidates. This precinct contains the famous, politically active and "correct" housing development called Village Homes, an area with a long standing progressive reputation. This is also the only upper middle class precinct that Forbes did not carry (and he ran only 6th in it). It is here, too, that Watkins had his single upper middle class victory (finishing 3rd after Rosenberg 1st and Partansky 2nd).

If Partansky's support was lop-sided in the "class-down" direction, Buckley and Forbes' votes were even more dramatically lop-sided in the opposite direction. Notice, though, that they do not run stronger than Skinner in the lower middle class.

### **Musings on Meanings**

What, then, do these two explorations into the role of class and lifestyle in the election tell us or not tell us about the supposed "surprise" of the June, 1992 Davis City Council election?

First, I think that identifying class effects in these data provides good evidence for one thing political pundits already thought they knew: There are solid but minority blocks of progressive and conservative voters. Neither of these is anywhere close to being a majority of the voters. Indeed, in an eight candidate field where each voter has three votes, if people cast their votes randomly, each candidate will receive 37.5% of the votes. It is remarkable, I think,

that for most candidates the actual pattern of citywide voting does not depart very far from what we would expect in random voting.<sup>7</sup>

Second, although significant minorities of every class are committed one or the other way, important other portions of these same classes are also flexible and clearly do not vote their “class interest” with consistency. Even the most strongly class candidates — Buckley, Forbes and Partansky — show considerable support in classes to whom they mostly do not appeal. For example, 25% of the scruffies did vote for Forbes; 34% of the upper middle class did vote for Partansky.

Third, these fluid segments of the various classes are especially responsive to candidates who do not send sharp class messages but who nonetheless are viewed by more ideological voters as class aligned. In the 1992 election, Rosenberg and Skinner were the two such candidates.

Fourth, with this as the context, (1) the specific number of candidates, (2) the distribution of the sharpness of their class messages, and (3) the number of open seats creates an election-specific dynamic in which the top vote getters will be a function of the particular structure of the field rather than of only the characteristics of the candidates. This, also, is a well known pundit truism. It can get more interesting, though, when we come to practical implications, just below.

Fifth, one implication of the four above points is that in any three seat election (and also perhaps in a two seat one), there is enough solid progressive and conservative vote to elect one of each as long as there is only one candidate of a sharply progressive or conservative image. In this, I am agreeing with the conventional observation that the conservatives “over-fielded” in having Skinner, Buckley, Forbes and Whitehead in the 1992 race.

But, let us not stop with the observation that the conservatives over-fielded. On the other side, it can also be said that the progressives over-fielded with Watkins. His relatively weak showing even in the class-precincts where Rosenberg and Partansky ran well may, in fact, be a clue to limits on the breadth and intensity of progressive support. Recall, indeed, the 54%-44% conservative-progressive division reported in Table 1, a finding suggesting a progressive base that is smaller than that of the conservatives. Watkins was a quite competent candidate and had a reasonably organized campaign, but he nonetheless could not match Rosenberg and Partansky even on his home turf. Why he did not brings us to a sixth point.

Sixth, my surmise is that Skinner was Watkins’ strongest competitor among progressive third votes, especially among such voters with less articulate and less strong liberal to progressive views. Reading across the top two rows of Table 5, we see that Buckley, Forbes and Whitehead were really not much competition for Watkins in the scruffy and perhaps apartment class precincts. Skinner ran quite well, however, and denied Watkins the level of

strength seen for Rosenberg and Partansky. A similar kind of effect is seen in the other classes. I venture to guess, indeed, that if Skinner were not in the race to attract the marginally progressive votes (together with less conservative voters), Watkins would have run quite considerably stronger — as would have Buckley and Forbes. In this sense, pundits may be overemphasizing Partansky as a “wild card” and surprise candidate in the race. The pivotal figure in denying stronger showings to both conservatives and progressives was the multi-hued figure of Maynard Skinner.

Following these lines of data and reasoning, then, the June surprise is at least a little less surprising.

### **Practical Implications**

What difference does all this make for practical politics? I think there are at least two major implications. First, I think these data mean that regardless of one’s progressive, liberal, conservative, or whatever politics, enormously more attention can fruitfully be given to influencing how many people of what political views become candidates in any year’s election. In my experience, a good deal of casual and speculative conversation on “the field” of candidates takes place in the period leading up the candidate filing deadline. To my knowledge, this speculation is not often translated into serious efforts to assess and act on the implications of various sizes and compositions of candidate fields. If action is taken, it is likely to be in the direction of putting more of “our” people in the field in the hope of greater gains. The lines of analysis I offer here suggest that one can easily field too many of one’s “own kind” of candidates, be these conservative or progressive, especially candidates whose class/lifestyle views are evident. The practical implication is that progressives or conservatives can maximize their chances of winning by fielding no more than one candidate clearly identified in class/lifestyle terms. The chances drop with two, and plummet with three. With more than two, the vote can split such that none of your “own” win.

This possibility is connected to a second practical implication. Placing moral merits or demerits of the matter to one side, candidates who are ambiguous or centrist in at least their most salient class appeals run strongly in fields where there are several more sharply defined candidates. Skinner was the champion centrist in the 1992 election. And, although Rosenberg has come to be seen by some people as a progressive or liberal, he has, right from the start of his Council career, been very careful to “fuzz up” his public persona with strong, centrist and “civic” themes. His quite remarkable success in this is seen clearly in Tables 4 and 5, where he runs weaker in the higher classes, but far stronger than Partansky and Watkins.<sup>8</sup> Notice, also, that he runs as strongly as Buckley and Forbes in the lower middle class, although they best him in precincts carried (but not raw vote) in the upper middle class. The practical implication from

the point of view of simply getting elected is to be a centrist candidate in a field of sharply defined competitors. This, indeed, brings these explorations full circle, for, it is a conclusion Lyn Lofland and I reached in our analysis of the 1984 Davis City Council Election, where we referred to this “class transcendent” posture as “lime politics,” meaning a very diluted version of environmentally conscious Green.<sup>9</sup>

\* \* \*

I need to close these explorations by making explicit the fact that I have taken a severely structuralist view of election dynamics. A structuralist view is a special “cut” on reality and it is not the only possible or appropriate view. In particular, I have purposely put to one side such conventional matters as the public records, accomplishments, and personalities of the candidates, how well their campaigns were organized and run, and the levels of their financing. All of these and other variables — such as gender and age — that affect the outcomes of elections are important, of course. My effort here, in contrast, has been to see how much understanding we can wring from an examination of the structural arrangements of an election itself and of the major groupings that are parties to it. To paraphrase an exiled German philosopher who hung out at the British Museum: People make their own history, but they do not make it in circumstances of their own choosing.

---

#### Notes

1. All elections statistics are calculated from photocopies of the official returns obtained from the County Clerk — Elections Office of Yolo County. I am indebted to Ron Ruggiero for his assiduous work on the calculations and for his very able assistance more generally.
2. John Lofland and Lyn H. Lofland, “Lime Politics: The Selectively Progressive Ethos of Davis, California,” *Research in Political Sociology* 3: 245-268 (1987).
3. In Table 2 we also see that the number of registered and actual voters did not increase in line with the overall growth of Davis between 1984 and 1992. With a population of about 36,000 in 1984, there were some 24,000 registered voters. With a population of 47,000 in 1992, there were about 27,00 registered voters. A proportionate increase would have resulted in about 31,300 registered voters in 1992. That is, there was a growth “short fall” of about 4,000 registered voters. Regarding actual voters, a proportional increase from 1984 to 1992 would have resulted in some 18,800 votes. The reality was about 15,500, a “short fall” of some 3,000 votes.

4. Lofland and Lofland, "Lime...", p. 257.  
 5. Lofland and Lofland, "Lime...", pp. 257-258, emphases deleted.  
 6. This is how I classified the 1992 Davis consolidated precincts:

<u>scruffy</u>	<u>apartments</u>	<u>working</u>	<u>lower middle</u>	<u>upper middle</u>	<u>heterogeneous</u>
23	29	77	26	28	24
25	33	78	35	34	27
68	38		71	37	30
69	73		79	74	31
70	86		81	75	32
72			82	76	36
			83	80	39
			85	87	84
				88	

7. Bear in mind, in contrast, that every voter could have bullet voted for a single candidate. The bottom row of Table 4 would then have contained seven zeros and one one-hundred percent.
8. Rosenberg was first elected to the Council in 1984 — the election whose statistics I have used here as a point of reference. He ran second in a field of seven, having finished a strong third two years earlier in a two seat election. The Davis Enterprise endorsement of him in 1984 praised him as a person who "promises to be an independent voice" that would assuage "some voter's fears of a liberal voting block developing on the council" (Davis Enterprise, June 1, 1984, p. 6, quoted and discussed in Lofland and Lofland, "Lime...", pp. 254-255).
9. Lofland and Lofland, "Lime..."

**Table 1**  
**Conservative-Progressive Voting in the 1984 and 1992**  
**Davis City Council Elections**

	1984	1992
Conservative Votes	52% (18,402)	54% (21,357)
Progressive Votes	48 (16,818)	44 (17,543)
Unclear	0	2 (702)
Total (total votes)	100% (35,219)	100% (39,602)

Conservative 1984 Vote (18,402) is the sum of votes for Taggart, Adler, Holloway and Gyorke.  
 Progressive 1984 Vote (16,818) is the sum of votes for Rosenberg, Corbett and Holmes.

Conservative '92 Vote (21,351) is the sum of votes for Skinner, Buckley, Forbes, & Whitehead.  
 Progressive 1992 Vote (17,543) is the sum of votes for Rosenberg, Partansky and Watkins.  
 Unclear 1992 Vote (702) is the vote for Milbrodt.

**Table 2**  
**Percent Voting in the 1984 and 1992**  
**Davis City Council Elections**

	1984	1992
Percent of Registered Voters Who Voted	60%	57%
(Number Voting)	(14,397)	(15,517)
(Number Registered)	(24,084)	(27,278)

**Table 3**  
**Percent of Each Class-Precinct Voting in the**  
**1984 and 1992 Davis City Council Elections**

<b>Class Precinct</b>	<b>1984 Percent Voting*</b>	<b>1992 Percent Voting</b>
<b>scruffy</b>	52%  (3,263)** (1,793)	50%  (4,287) (2,144)
<b>apartments</b>	50  (4,915) (2,475)	44  (4,119) (1,807)
<b>working</b>	61  (1,824) (1,120)	64  (1,776) (1,130)
<b>lower middle</b>	64  (6,253) (4,019)	59  (5,516) (3,266)
<b>upper middle</b>	65  (5,603) (3,660)	64  (5,555) (3,593)
<b>heterogeneous</b>	60  (2,226) (1,317)	59  (6,025) (3,545)
<b>city-wide</b>	60%  (24,084) (14,353)	57%  (27,278) (15,517)

\*The 1984 Elections Report did not list absentee ballots by precinct. There were 844 such ballots. These have been assigned to each class level in proportion to the percentage size of each level. Thus, fourteen percent of the absentees were added to the Scruffy level, and so on for the other levels. Because of rounding, total voters shown here are slightly less than the actual 14,397.

\*\* The top number in parenthesis in each cell is the number of registered voters in each class. The bottom one is the number who voted.

**Table 4**  
**Percent Voting for Each Candidate**  
**At Each Level of Class-Precinct**

Class-Precincts	Candidates							
	Rosen- berg 1	Partan- sky 2	Skinner 3	Buckley 4	Forbes 5	Watkins 6	White- head 7	Milb 8
<b>scruffy</b> (2,144)*	<b>47</b> (1,002)	<b>54</b> (1,161)	<b>31</b> (667)	<b>25</b> (534)	<b>25</b> (532)	<b>41</b> (877)	<b>24</b> (516)	<b>5</b> (11)
<b>apart- ments</b> (1,807)	<b>50</b> (908)	<b>44</b> (799)	<b>46</b> (829)	<b>28</b> (505)	<b>30</b> (548)	<b>29</b> (527)	<b>16</b> (297)	<b>3</b> (5)
<b>working</b> (1,130)	<b>40</b> (457)	<b>40</b> (450)	<b>36</b> (402)	<b>38</b> (435)	<b>35</b> (390)	<b>33</b> (377)	<b>31</b> (352)	<b>5</b> (6)
<b>lower middle</b> (3,296)	<b>40</b> (1,310)	<b>35</b> (1,165)	<b>40</b> (1,334)	<b>39</b> (1,285)	<b>41</b> (1,339)	<b>28</b> (911)	<b>28</b> (930)	<b>5</b> (16)
<b>upper middle</b> (3,595)	<b>42</b> (1,517)	<b>34</b> (1,237)	<b>42</b> (1,504)	<b>43</b> (1,553)	<b>42</b> (1,507)	<b>30</b> (1,076)	<b>24</b> (873)	<b>5</b> (16)
<b>hetero- geneous</b> (3,545)	<b>40</b> (1,420)	<b>39</b> (1,378)	<b>39</b> (1,377)	<b>40</b> (1,421)	<b>39</b> (1,392)	<b>28</b> (987)	<b>24</b> (834)	<b>4</b> (14)
<b>Citywide Percent of Vote</b> (15,517)** (39,602)***	<b><u>43</u></b> (6608)	<b><u>40</u></b> (6190)	<b><u>39</u></b> (6,114)	<b><u>37</u></b> (5733)	<b><u>37</u></b> (5,708)	<b><u>31</u></b> (4,745)	<b><u>25</u></b> (3,802)	<b><u>5</u></b> (70)

\* Number of voters in the class-precinct.

\*\* Total number of voters.

\*\*\* Total votes cast.

**Table 5**  
**Percent of Precincts Each Candidate Carried**  
**At Each Level of Class-Precinct**

Class-Precincts	Candidates							
	Rosen- berg 1	Partan- sky 2	Skinner 3	Buckley 4	Forbes 5	Watkins 6	White- head 7	Milb 8
<b>scruffy</b> (6)*	<b>100</b> (6)	<b>100</b> (6)	<b>50</b> (3)	<b>0</b> (0)	<b>0</b> (0)	<b>67</b> (4)	<b>0</b> (0)	<b>0</b> (0)
<b>apart- ments</b> (5)	<b>80</b> (4)	<b>80</b> (4)	<b>80</b> (4)	<b>0</b> (0)	<b>50</b> (1)	<b>25</b> (2)	<b>0</b> (0)	<b>0</b> (0)
<b>working</b> (2)	<b>100</b> (2)	<b>100</b> (2)	<b>0</b> (0)	<b>50</b> (1)	<b>0</b> (0)	<b>0</b> (0)	<b>50</b> (1)	<b>0</b> (0)
<b>lower middle</b> (8)	<b>63</b> (5)	<b>25</b> (2)	<b>63</b> (5)	<b>63</b> (5)	<b>63</b> (5)	<b>0</b> (0)	<b>13</b> (1)	<b>0</b> (0)
<b>upper middle</b> (9)	<b>44</b> (4)	<b>11</b> (1)	<b>56</b> (6)	<b>63</b> (7)	<b>89</b> (8)	<b>11</b> (1)	<b>0</b> (0)	<b>0</b> (0)
<b>hetero- geneous</b> (8)	<b>75</b> (6)	<b>38</b> (3)	<b>75</b> (6)	<b>50</b> (4)	<b>50</b> (4)	<b>13</b> (1)	<b>0</b> (0)	<b>0</b> (0)
<b>Citywide Percent of Precincts Carried</b> (38)**	<u><b>71</b></u> (27)***	<u><b>47</b></u> (18)	<u><b>66</b></u> (25)	<u><b>45</b></u> (17)	<u><b>47</b></u> (18)	<u><b>21</b></u> (8)	<u><b>5</b></u> (2)	<u><b>0</b></u> (0)

\* Number of precincts at this class level.

\*\* Total precincts.

\*\*\* Number of precincts carried.